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PREFACE 
Broadly s t a t e d ,  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  s t e p s  i n  environmental  q u a l i t y  
management. These a r e  ( 1 )  s e l e c t i o n  of environmental  q u a l i t y  s tan-  
a r d s ,  ( 2 )  determinat ion  of f e a s i b l e  programs f o r  reducing d ischarges  
t o  t h e  environment o r  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  i ts  a s s i m i l a t i v e  c a p a c i t i e s ,  
and ( 3 )  implementation of a p o l i c y  t o  b r i n g  about d ischarge  reduc- 
t i o n s  and/or expansion of a s s i m i l a t i v e  capac i ty .  
Much of  R E N f s  r e sea rch  program has been devoted t o  s t a t e -o f -  
t h e - a r t  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  e f f e c t s  of d ischarges  on environmental 
systems and modif ica t ions  i n  environmental systems t h a t  could be 
made t o  enhance s y s t e m s l a b i l i t i e s  t o  a s s i m i l a t e  d i scha rges .  For 
example, case  s t u d i e s  of Lake Balaton i n  Hungary and Attersee and 
Neusiedlersee i n  Aus t r i a  have advanced t h e  s t a t e  of  t h e  a r t  of 
modeling water  q u a l i t y  and a r e  providin? a menu of f e a s i b l e  pro- 
grams f o r  managing t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e s e  l akes .  
Subsequent REN s t u d i e s  w i l l  b u i l d  on t h e s e  modeling e f f o r t s  
t o  eva lua te  a l t e r n a t i v e  management plans and p o l i c i e s .  This work- 
i n g  paper is  t h e  f i r s t  of a series of r e p o r t s  t h a t  a r e  planned t o  
r e s u l t  from these  e f f o r t s .  I t  cons iders  t h e  problem of choosing 
a p o l i c y  instrument  ( i . e .  a means t o  implement environmental qual-  
i t y  s tandards)  t h a t  is  both e f f e c t i v e  (i .e. w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  en- 
vironmental  q u a l i t y  s t andard  being m e t )  and e f f i c i e n t  ( i . e .  w i l l  
m e e t  s tandard  a t  l e a s t  c o s t ) .  Three a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  instruments  
are considered.  These a r e  (1 )  emission s t andards ,  which p r e s c r i b e  
maximum allowable r a t e s  of d ischarges  of p o l l u t a n t s  t o  the environ- 
ment, ( 2 )  emission charges,  which p r e s c r i b e  payments t h a t  emitters 
must make pe r  u n i t  of p o l l u t i o n  discharged t o  t h e  environment, and 
( 3 )  t r a n s f e r a b l e  emission permi ts ,  which e n t i t l e  t h e i r  ho lder  t o  
a face  value q u a n t i t y  of emissions,  and which may be t r a n s f e r r e d  
among e m i t t e r s .  
iii 
REN's analyses of specific environmental management problems 
dramatically illustrate that uncertainty pervades the modeling 
and management process. Until recently, this fact of the modeling 
and management problem (i.e. uncertainty) was largely ignored in 
studies of the policy instrument question. This paper builds on 
the recent literature to show how, in the presence of uncertainty, 
policy might best be fashioned to meet an environmental uuality 
standard efficiently. 
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INSTRUMENTS FOR MEETING AN 
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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
Seve ra l  papers  have examined t h e  e f f e c t  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  on 
* 
th.e cho ice  of p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  p o l i c y  in s t rumen t s .  These papers  
have shown t h a t  t h e  op t imal  p o l i c y  ins t rument  ( i . e .  t h e  p o l i c y  
ins t rument-- including emiss ion  t a x e s ,  emiss ion s t a n d a r d s ,  o r  t r a n s -  
f e r a b l e  emiss ion permi t s - - tha t  maximizes expec ted  n e t  s o c i a l  bene- 
f i t s )  depends upon t h e  s p e c i f i c  c i rcumstances  a t  hand. I n  p a r t i c -  
u l a r ,  it has  been shown t h a t  when t h e  marginal  c o s t s  and x a r g i n a l  
b e n e f i t s  o£ p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  are u n c e r t a i n ,  t h e  type  o f  p o l i c y  
ins t rument  t h a t  maximizes expec ted  n e t  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  depends 
upon t h e  parameters of  t h e  marginal  c o s t  and marginal  b e n e f i t  func- 
t i o n s ,  and t h e  form i n  which randomness e n t e r s  t h e  model. 
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  p roces s  by which most environmental  q u a l i t y  
t a r g e t s  a r e  set d.oes n o t  i nvo lve  an  a t t empt  t o  maximize expected 
s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  from use  of environmental  r e s o u r c e s .  Ra ther ,  qua l -  
i t y  s t anda rds  a r e  set based upon o t h e r  c r i t e r i a  such as t h e  pro- 
t e c t i o n  of t h e  h e a l t h  of  t h e  most s u s c e p t i b l e  segments of t h e  po- 
p u l a t i o n ,  wi th  an adequate  margin of s a f e t y .  
This  paper  examines t h e  e f f e c t  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  on t h e  choice  
of  p o l i c y  ins t ruments  i n  ca ses  i n  which t h e  o b j e c t i v e  is  t o  f i n d  
--- - 
* 
See Adar and G r i f f i n  (1976), Fi she l son  (1976) , and Yohe (1976) 
a po l i cy  t h a t  minimizes t h e  expected c o s t  of meeting a  given environ- 
mental q u a l i t y  s tandard .  These cases ,  a s  noted above, t y p i f y  t h e  
po l i cy  problem when q u a l i t y  s tandards  a r e  based,  a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t ,  
on non-economic c r i t e r i a .  
Our a n a l y s i s  w i l l  show t h a t  r a t h e r  d e f i n i t e  conclus ions  can 
be reached concerning opt imal  po l i cy  ins t ruments  f o r  minimizing 
expected c o s t s  of meeting an environmental q u a l i t y  s t anda rd .  I n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  w i l l  demonstrate t h a t  two p o l i c y  instruments--  
emission charges and t r a n s f e r a b l e  emission permits--wil l  always 
meet q u a l i t y  s t anda rds  a t  lower expected t o t a l  c o s t  than  w i l l  an 
emission s t anda rds  po l i cy .  We w i l l  a l s o  demonstrate t h a t  imple- 
mentation of environmental  q u a l i t y  s t anda rds  v i a  emission s t anda rds  
o r  t r a n s f e r a b l e  emission permi ts  provides  g r e a t e r  c e r t a i n t y  than 
does implementation v i a  an  emission charges  po l i cy  t h a t  environ- 
mental q u a l i t y  s t anda rds  w i l l  be m e t .  Thus, i f  one wishes  t o  adopt 
a  po l i cy  t h a t  minimizes expected c o s t s  of meeting a  q u a l i t y  s t an -  
dard wi th  a  r e l a t i v e l y  high degree of c e r t i t u d e ,  t r a n s f e r a b l e  e m i s -  
s i o n  permi ts  a r e  t h e  b e s t  of t h e  t h r e e  p o l i c y  ins t ruments  examined. 
The p lan  of t h e  paper i s  a s  fol lows.  I n  Sec t ion  2 w e  examine 
a  s imple  diagrammatic model t h a t  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  f a c t o r s  involved 
i n  a  comparison of p o l i c y  ins t ruments  t o  m e e t  environmental  q u a l i t y  
s t anda rds  when t h e r e  i s  u n c e r t a i n t y .  Sec t ion  3 g e n e r a l i z e s  t h i s  
a n a l y s i s  by d e r i v i n g  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same r e s u l t s  i n  a  more gene ra l  
mathematical framework. Sec t ion  4 o f f e r s  some concluding comments. 
2. A SIMPLE DIAGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS 
To begin,  l e t  us examine a  s imple  case  i n  which t h e r e  a r e  two 
p o l l u t i o n  sources  ( i . e .  two " e m i t t e r s " )  and one p o i n t  a t  which an 
environmental  q u a l i t y  s t anda rd  must be met ( i .e .  one " r e c e p t o r " ) .  
W e  assume t h a t  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  i s  u n c e r t a i n  about 
one of t h e  emit ter 's  (which w e  s h a l l  c a l l  " E m i t t e r  1"  below) c o s t s  
of c o n t r o l l i n g  emissions.  The a u t h o r i t y  i s  assumed t o  know e x a c t l y  
( i . e .  without  u n c e r t a i n t y )  t h e  o t h e r  emit ter 's  e . ,  "Emit te r  2 " )  
c o n t r o l  c o s t s  and t h e  d i f f u s i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  r e l a t e  u n i t s  of 
emissions from both of the emitters t o  t h e  concent ra t ion  of  pol- 
l u t i o n  a t  t h e  s i n g l e  r e c e p t o r  s i t e .  
T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  d e p i c t e d  i n  F i g u r e  1  below, where w e  have 
shown E m i t t e r  1's m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  e m i s s i o n  c o n t r o l  c u r v e s .  I n  
drawing t h i s  f i g u r e ,  w e  have  assumed t h a t  E m i t t e r  1's marg ina l  c o s t  
o f  c o n t r o l  c u r v e  may t a k e  on  o n e  o f  two v a l u e s ,  shown r e s p e c t i v e l y  
* by t h e  c u r v e s  C ( u l  ) and C ( u 2 )  , where u  is  a random v a r i a b l e .  The 
d o t t e d  c u r v e  C 1 - C  r e p r e s e n t s  E m i t t e r  2 ' s  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  c u r v e .  W e  
have deno ted  t h e  optimum ( i . e . ,  l eas t  c o s t )  l e v e l s  o f  e m i s s i o n s  
from E m i t t e r  1 t h a t  are c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  t h e  env i ron-  
menta l  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  by t h e  v e r t i c a l  l i n e s  G l  and G 2  i n  t h e  
- 
f i g u r e .  The fo rmer ,  e l ,  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  optimum l e v e l  o f  E m i t t e r  1's 
e m i s s i o n s  i f  t h e  random v a r i a b l e  u  t a k e s  on t h e  v a l u e  u , ,  and G 2  
r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  emitter 's  optimum l e v e l  of e m i s s i o n s  i f  u  t a k e s  on 
** 
t h e  v a l u e  u2.  
The p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  d o e s  n o t  know i n  advance which 
v a l u e  u  w i l l  t a k e  o n  s o  it c a n n o t  s e t  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d s ,  a quan- 
t i t y  o f  m a r k e t a b l e  p e r m i t s ,  o r  e m i s s i o n  c h a r g e s  t h a t  w i l l  be  ex-  
a c t l y  c o r r e c t ,  e x c e p t  by a c c i d e n t .  R a t h e r ,  t h e  b e s t  it c a n  hope t o  
do is  t o  f i n d  a p o l i c y  t h a t  i s  b e s t  i n  some a v e r a g e  s e n s e .  T h i s  i n -  
deed i s  a s e n s i b l e  o b j e c t i v e  f o r  it t o  p u r s u e .  W e  s h a l l  assume t h a t  
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t  chosen  by t h e  a u t h o r i t y ,  
i t s  g o a l  is t o  minimize e x p e c t e d  ( i n  a mathemat ica l  s e n s e )  costs sub- 
ject t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  e x p e c t e d  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  of  p o l l u t i o n  i n  
t h e  envi ronment  d o e s  n o t  exceed t h e  env i ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d s .  
I f  t h i s  is t h e  o b j e c t i v e  pursued  by t h e  agency,  and i f  it 
chooses  r e g u l a t i o n  f o r  i ts  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t ,  t h e n  i t  c a n  b e  shown 
h 
t h a t  it w i l l  set a n  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d ,  e ,  i n s i d e  t h e  r a n g e  of  v a 1 v . e ~  
o f  optimum e m i s s i o n s  l e v e l s  under  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s s i b l e  c o s t  condi-  
t i o n s  ( i - e . ,  between el  and e 2 ) .  The e x a c t  l e v e l s  o f  t h e  e m i s s i o n  
s t a n d a r d s  t h a t  w i l l  minimize expec ted  c o s t s  s u b j e c t s  t o  t h e  env i ron-  
menta l  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  depends  upon t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  
t h e  u n c e r t a i n  m a r g i n a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
* 
The l i n e a r i t y  of  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  c o n t r o l  c u r v e s  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  second o r d e r  t e r m s  from a n  approx imat ion  o f  
t h e  unknown t o t a l  c o s t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The assumpt ion  i s  t h a t  t h e  
s l o p e  o f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  c o n t r o l  c u r v e  i s  known; u n c e r t a i n t y  
i n v o l v e s  o n l y  t h e  i n t e r c e p t .  See  a l s o  S e c t i o n s  3 and 4 .  
- 
**  - 
That  i s ,  e l  is  t h e  l e v e l  o f  E m i t t e r  1  's e m i s s i o n s  t h a t  e q u a t e s  t h e  
m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  o f  p o l l u t i o n  r e d u c t i o n  from E m i t t e r s  1  and 2  i f  
u  = u l ;  
- 
e2 is t h e  l e v e l  t h a t  a c h i e v e s  t h i s  i f  u  = u2. E m i t t e r  2 ' s  
e m i s s i o n s  are a d j u s t e d  c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  i t s  marg ina l  
c o s t  o f  p o l l u t i o n  r e d u c t i o n  i s  e q u a l  t o  E m i t t e r  1 ' s  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  
o f  p o l l u t i o n  r e d u c t i o n ,  and t h a t  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  s t a n d a r d  i s  m e t .  
Legend : 
u = random variable with values u, or u2. 
e = optimal emission standard if u i s  unknown. 
= optimal emissions charge if u is  unknown. 
Til = optimal emissions if u = ul. 
- 
e2 = optimal emissions if u = u2. 
U 
el = resulting emissions if emissions charge u 
issetatpandu=ul. 
rCI 
e2 = resulting emissions if emissions charge u 
is  set  a t  p and u = u2. 
Emissions 
F i g u r e  1 .  Diagrammatic A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  E f f e c t  
o f  U n c e r t a i n t y  o n  P o l i c y  I n s t r u m e n t  
Choice .  
q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d ,  and t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  d i f f u s i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
t h a t  r e l a t e  e m i s s i o n s  t o  env i ronmenta l  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  p o l l u -  
t a n t s .  
Wehave drawn $ i n  F i g u r e  1 a s  though it f e l l  p r e c i s e l y  mid- 
way between e l  and e2. T h i s  would o c c u r  i n  f a c t  i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
shown i n  which P r o b a b i l i t y  ( u = u l )  = P r o b a b i l i t y  ( u = u 2 ) =  0 . 5 ,  i f  
t h e  d i f f u s i o n  p a r a m e t e r s  t r a n s l a t i n g  t h e  e m i s s i o n s  o f  e a c h  
s o u r c e  i n t o  ambient  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  a t  t h e  assumed r e c e p t o r  w e r e  
e q u a l ,  and if t h e  marg ina l  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  o f  E m i t t e r  2  (shown by 
t h e  d o t t e d  l i n e  C ' - C "  i n  F i g u r e  1 )  f e l l  e x a c t l y  ha l fway between 
t h e  two marg ina l  c o s t  f u n c t i o n s  shown f o r  E m i t t e r  1 .  I n  t h i s  
c a s e ,  t h e  e m i s s i o n s  s t a n d a r d  f o r  E m i t t e r  2  would a l s o  be set 
a t  t h e  l e v e l  i2. 
If t h e  a u t h o r i t y  d e c i d e s  t o  implement t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y  
s t a n d a r d  v i a  a n  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d ,  it o b v i o u s l y  w i l l  be c e r t a i n  a b o u t  
* 
t h e  r e s u l t i n g  l e v e l  of e m i s s i o n s .  E m i t t e r  1 (and E m i t t e r  2 )  w i l l  
e m i t  g. If d i f f u s i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  are known w i t h  c e r t a i n t y  ( a s  
w e  have assumed h e r e ) ,  t h i s  a l s o  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t y ,  if it 
r e s o r t e d  t o  u s e  of e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d s ,  would be a b s o l u t e l y  c e r t a i n  
t h a t  t h e  ambient  s t a n d a r d  would be m e t .  
T h i s  c e r t a i n t y  abou t  e m i s s i o n s  and env i ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  
comes a t  a  c o s t .  I n s p e c t i o n  o f  F i g u r e  1 shows t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  would be c e r t a i n  a b o u t  t h e  c o s t s  o f  c o n t r o l  i n c u r r e d  
by E m i t t e r  2,  E m i t t e r  1 ' s cpsts c o u l d  e i t h e r  be a n  amount g i v e n  
by t h e  t r i a n g l e  6 R C ( u , ) ,  o r  a  somewhat l a r g e r  amount g i v e n  by 
t h e  t r i a n g l e  6 R 1 C ( u 2 ) .  Which c o s t  i n  f a c t  i s  i n c u r r e d  w i l l  I 
depend upon t h e  unknown ( t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t y )  v a l u e  t a k e n  on by 
t h e  random v a r i a b l e  u.  The c o s t  o f  t h e  c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  e m i s s i o n s  
and env i ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  g u a r a n t e e d  by r e s o r t  t o  t h e  e m i s s i o n  
s t a n d a r d s  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t  i s  t h u s  t h a t  t h e  c o s t s  i n c u r r e d  f o r  
c o n t r o l  a r e  u n c e r t a i n ,  and may t u r n  o u t  t o  b e  v e r y  l a r g e .  
A s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d s ,  t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  might  s e e k  t o  se t  c h a r g e s  on e m i s s i o n s  t h a t  would minimize 
e x p e c t e d  c o s t  and would a c h i e v e  e x p e c t e d  ambient  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  
e q u a l  t o  t h e  s t a n d a r d  l e v e l .  Such a c h a r g e  is  d e p i c t e d  i n  F i g u r e  1 
- 
by t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  l i n e ,  p.  Under t h i s  c h a r g e ,  E m i t t e r  1 ' s  e m i s s i o n s  
a r e  u n c e r t a i n .  They w i l l  e i t h e r  b e  G 2  o r  S1 ,  depending upon t h e  
* 
W e  assume c o s t l e s s  m o n i t o r i n g .  
* 
va lue  taken  on by u. Th is  means t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  environmental  
q u a l i t y  a l s o  i s  u n c e r t a i n .  I f  u  t a k e s  on t h e  va lue  u2 ,  t hen  
r e s u l t i n g  p o l l u t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  w i l l  exceed t h e  environmental  
s t anda rd .  I f ,  however, it t a k e s  on t h e  va lue  u l ,  p o l l u t i o n  con- 
c e n t r a t i o n s  w i l l  be  lower t han  t h e  s t anda rd  l e v e l .  The charge  
l e v e l  is  set  s o  t h a t  i f  w e  took t h e  expec ted  (average)  v a l u e  of  
t h e  marginal  c o s t  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  Emi t te r  1 (which i s  equa l  t o  
C ' - C ) ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  emiss ions  would s a t i s f y  t h e  ambient  con- 
s t r a i n t .  
While a charge  p o l i c y  r e s u l t s ,  as shown above, i n  u n c e r t a i n t y  
abou t  environmental  p o l l u t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ,  it r e s u l t s  i n  p e r f e c t  
c e r t a i n t y  about  c o s t s .  Th is  can be  s e e n  by examining t o t a l  c o s t s  
under a  charge  p o l i c y  a s  shown i n  F igu re  1 .  I f  u  t a k e s  on t h e  Value 
u2 then  t o t a l  c o s t s  are g iven  by t h e  a r e a  o f  t h e  t r i a n g l e  G 2 B C ( u 2 ) .  
I f  u t a k e s  on t h e  v a l u e  u l ,  t hen  t o t a l  c o s t s  are given  by  t h e  a r e a  
of t h e  t r i a n g l e  B1 B '  C ( u l  ) . These two t r i a n g l e s ,  it can be  shown, 
have p r e c i s e l y  t h e  same a r e a .  Hence, w e  conclude t h a t  no matter 
**  
which va lue  u  t a k e s ,  t o t a l  c o s t s  w i l l  be t h e  same amount. Thus 
t h e r e ' i s  no u n c e r t a i n t y  about  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  c o s t .  
To t h i s  p o i n t  w e  have cons idered  two p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  emis- 
s i o n  s t a n d a r d s  and emiss ion  charges ,  which ach ieve  expec ted  e n - .  
v i ronmenta l  p o l l u t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  e q u a l  t o  an environmental  
q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d .  W e  have shown t h a t  u s e  of  t h e  emiss ion  s t a n -  
da rd  p o l i c y  r e s u l t s  i n  c e r t a i n t y  about  emiss ions  and ambient  con- 
c e n t r a t i o n s ,  and u n c e r t a i n t y  abou t  c o s t s .  U s e  of  t h e  emiss ion  
charges  p o l i c y  i n s t rumen t ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  r e s u l t s  i n  u n c e r t a i n t y  
abou t  emiss ions  and ambient  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ,  and c e r t a i n t y  about  
c o s t s .  
The f i n a l  s t e p  of  o u r  comparison of  t h e s e  two p o l i c y  i n s t r u -  
ments i s  t o  examine t h e i r  expec ted  c o s t s .  To do t h i s  u s ing  ou r  d i a -  
gram, w e  must make use  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  assumptions  w e  have made 
f o r  t h i s  example. Expected c o s t s  under t h e  emiss ion  cha rges  approach 
* 
E m i t t e r  2 ' s  emiss ions  a t  a  cha rge  o f  p,  i n  t h e  c a s e  d e p i c t e d  i n  
F igu re  1 ,  would be  $, 
* *  
S e c t i o n  3 e x p l a i n s  t h e  mathematical  assumptions  about  u n c e r t a i n t y  
i n  c o s t  t h a t  l e a d  t o  t h i s  r e s u l t .  
a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  t o  compute s i n c e ,  under our  assumptions ,  
t h e  charge  p o l i c y  removes u n c e r t a i n t y  about c o s t s .  Emi t t e r  1 ' s  
expected c o s t s  under t h e  cha rge  p o l i c y  a r e  simply S2B C ( u 2 ) ,  o r  
- 
e l  B I C ( u l )  (which a r e  e q u a l ) .  These a r e  equa l  t o  $ B"C, which 
is  t h e  a r e a  we s h a l l  use  t o  compare t h e  expected c o s t s  o f  a  
charge  p o l i c y  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  a  r e g u l a t o r y  p o l i c y .  Emi t t e r  2 " s  
expected c o s t  o f  c o n t r o l ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  d e p i c t e d ,  i s  a l s o  @B"C. 
Emi t t e r  1's expected c o s t s  under t h e  emiss ion  s t a n d a r d s  
approach a r e  g iven  by one-half  ( i . e .  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  u  t a k e s  
on t h e  va lue  u l )  t i m e s  t h e  a r e a  of  t h e  t r i a n g l e  @R C ( u l )  ( i . e .  
t o t a l  c o s t  when u t a k e s  on t h e  va lue  u 2 ) .  E m i t t e r  2 ' s  c o s t s  a r e  
@B"C. 
L e t  t h e  d i s t a n c e  between t h e  p o i n t s  R and R ' ,  and C ( u l )  
and C ( u 2 ) ,  be  denoted by d .  F u r t h e r ,  l e t  t h e  d i s t a n c e  between 
@ and R be denoted by h  and t h e  d i s t a n c e  between @ and C ( u l )  be 
denoted by b. L e t  us a l s o  n e g l e c t  E m i t t e r  2 ' s  c o s t s  s i n c e  
t hey  a r e  t h e  same amount ( i . e .  @ B W C )  under bo th  p o l i c i e s .  Then, 
we know, u s ing  t h e  s p e c i f i c s  behind t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  F igu re  
1 t h a t  t h e  a r e a  o f  t h e  t r i a n g l e  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  expected c o s t s  
under emiss ion  cha rges  ( i g n o r i n g  Emi t t e r  2 ' s  c o s t s )  i s  
Expected Cos t  Under Emission Charge = 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' Area ( B  B" C )  = 7 (b+ld) (hi-$) = Zbh + adh+adb%d- 
The expected c o s t  under emiss ion  s t a n d a r d s  ( aga in  i gno r ing  
E m i t t e r  2 ' s  c o s t s )  i s  given  by t h e  weighted (by t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  a l t e r n a t i v e  v a l u e s  o f  u)  a r e a s  of  t h e  two t r i -  
a n g l e s  ( 6  3 C ( u l  ) and (@ R ' C  ( u 2 )  ) d e s c r i b e d  above. Th i s  expec ted  
va lue  i s  
Expected Cos t  Under Emission S tandards  = 
A comparison of t h e  expec ted  c o s t  under emiss ion  cha rges  wi th  
t h a t  under emiss ion s t a n d a r d s  shows t h a t  t h e  former i s  s m a l l e r  by 
1 2  t h e  amount gd ( i . e . ,  1 2  1 2  3 - g d  ) .  
That  is ,  w e  have shown ( a l b e i t  under s p e c i a l  c i rcumstances  
which w e  w i l l  g e n e r a l i z e  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n )  t h a t  t h e  expected 
c o s t  o f  implementing on  environmental  s t a n d a r d  v i a  an emiss ion  
chargesapproach  is less t han  t h a t  of implementing it v i a  an e m i s -  
s i o n ,  s t a n d a r d s  approach.  A s  noted  above,  however, u n c e r t a i n t y  
about  r e s u l t i n g  emiss ions  and ambient c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  is g r e a t e r  
under emiss ion  cha rges  t han  it i s  under emiss ion  s t anda rds .  
To complete o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  l e t  us  cons ide r  p o s s i b l e  outcomes 
o f  a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  emiss ion pe rmi t s  approach. Our assumption i n  
conduct ing t h i s  a n a l y s i s  is  t h a t  E m i t t e r s  1 and 2  know t h e i r  c o s t s  
o f  c o n t r o l  w i th  c e r t a i n t y ,  and r e v e a l  them i n  t h e  p roces s  o f  buying 
and s e l l i n g  t r a n s f e r a b l e  permits. .  That i s ,  t h e  schedule  o f  b i d s  sub- 
m i t t e d  by E m i t t e r  1 ,  under a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  pe rmi t  p o l i c y  would be  e i t h e r  
C ( u l )  o r  C ( u 2 ) ,  depending upon t h e  v a l u e  a c t u a l l y  t aken  by u ,  wh i l e  
E m i t t e r  2 would submit  t h e  schedule  o f  b i d s  C ' C .  Note t h a t  i f  t h e  
b idd ing  p roces s  o p e r a t e s  as w e  have assumed, a t  t h e  t i m e  t h e  au thor -  
i t y  must a l l o c a t e  p e r m i t s  t o  b i d d e r s ,  a l l  u n c e r t a i n t y  has  been re- 
moved. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  it now knows what E m i t t e r  1's c o s t s  are w i t h  
c e r t a i n t y .  Th i s  has  two consequences. F i r s t ,  it can be a b s o l u t e l y  
c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  pe rmi t s  chosen i n  f a c t  w i l l  minimize 
c o s t s .  Moreover, b e f o r e  b i d s  a r e  r e c e i v e d ,  the a u t h o r i t y  knows t h a t  
an  - e x p o s t  op t ima l  d e c i s i o n  w i l l  be made. Thus, e x  a n t e  ( i .e . ,  be- 
-- 
f o r e  b i d s  a r e  r ece ived )  expected c o s t s  under a t r a n s f e r a b l e  permi t  
approach w i l l  be p r e c i s e l y  t h e  same as t h o s e  under an emiss ion 
cha rge  approach.  
The second consequence of knowing E m i t t e r  1 ' s  c o s t s  w i th  ce r -  
t a i n t y  and a l l o c a t i n g  p e r m i t s  acco rd ing ly  is  t h a t  u n c e r t a i n t y  about  
r e s u l t i n g  emiss ions  and ambient  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  i s  a l s o  removed. The 
a u t h o r i t y  can be c e r t a i n  of  each emitter's emiss ion  l e v e l s .  
Our s imple  diagrammatic a n a l y s i s  t h u s  l e a d s  us  t o  conclude t h a t  
implementat ion o f  an  environmental  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  v i a  t h e  t r a n s f e r -  
a b l e  pe rmi t s  o r  emiss ions  charge  p o l i c y  i n s t rumen t s  r e s u l t s  i n  lower 
expected c o n t r o l  c o s t s  t han  does  implementat ion v i a  emiss ion  s t a n -  
da rds .  Moreover, t h e  t r a n s f e r a b l e  pe rmi t s  i n s t rumen t  o f f e r s  a s  
g r e a t  c e r t a i n t y  abou t  r e s u l t i n g  emiss ions  and ambient  environmental  
q u a l i t y  as does t h e  emiss ion  s t a n d a r d s  i n s t rumen t ,  and bo th  r e s u l t  
i n  g r e a t e r  c e r t a i n t y  about  environmental  q u a l i t y  t han  does  t h e  
emiss ion  charges  ins t rument .  
3. A MATHEMATICAL AiqALYSIS 
W e  c a n  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e s e  c o n c l u s i o n s  more r i g o r o u s l y  and ex- 
t e n d  them a b i t  by means o f  a r e l a t i v e l y  s i m p l e  a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  
a n a l y s i s  p a r a l l e l s  Weitzman's (1974) a n a l y s i s  o f  economic p lann ing .  
3.1 Formula t ion  
For  t h i s  purpose ,  it i s  h e l p f u l  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a modest amount 
o f  n o t a t i o n ,  and some s i m p l i f y i n g  assumpt ions .  Our b a s i c  assump- 
t i o n s  are t h e s e :  
( a )  W e  c o n f i n e  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  case o f  a s i n g l e  
r e c e p t o r .  
( b )  L e t  Ci(e i ,u i )  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  ith emi t t e r ' s  c o s t  
f u n c t i o n ,  where ei r e p r e s e n t s  i ts q u a n t i t y  o f  
p o l l u t a n t  e m i s s i o n s ,  and ui is a random v a r i a b l e  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  the c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y ' s  u n c e r t a i n t y  
a b o u t  t h e  emit ter ' s  c o s t s .  Ci (e i ,u i )  i s  assumed t o  
be  t w i c e  c o n t i n u o u s  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e ,  and i t s  d e r i v a -  
t i v e s  are  assumed t o  p o s s e s s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p roper -  
t ies :  a c i ( e i , u i ) / a e i  = Cil < 0 ;  aCi (e i ,u i ) / au i  > 0:  
2 ~ i ( e i , ~ i )  he. 1 aui > 0 ;  a 2 c i ( u i ) / a e i 2  = cill > O .  
( c )  L e t  di (v i )  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  u n c e r t a i n  c o e f f i c i e n t  of  
p r o p o r t i o n  r e l a t i n g  u n i t s  o f  p o l l u t a n t  e m i s s i o n s  
from t h e  ith emitter t o  ambient  p o l l u t i o n  concen- 
t r a t i o n s  a t  a r e c e p t o r .  " v  " is a random v a r i a b l e  i 
r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  a g e n c y ' s  u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  t h e  
p o l l u t i o n  d i f f u s i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
(d l  L e t w s "  r e p r e s e n t  a n  ambien t  p o l l u t i o n  s t a n d a r d .  
(el E ( v i t u  ) = E ( v i ) E ( u . )  = 0, where E is the mathe- j I 
matical e x p e c t a t i o n  o p e r a t o r ;  t h a t  is, t h e  random 
v a r i a b l e s  ui and  v  are s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  j 
f o r  a l l  i and j. 
(£1 I n  view of  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  d i f f u s i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  
t h e  a u t h o r i t y  s e e k s  c o n t r o l  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a c h i e v e  
e x p e c t e d  ambient  p o l l u t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  e q u a l  t o  
t h e  ambien t  p o l l u t i o n  s t a n d a r d .  
( g )  The emit ter  knows i t s  c o n t r o l  c o s t s  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y .  
These assumptions a r e  s t ronger  than s t r i c t l y  a r e  requi red  
t o  de r ive  t h e  r e s u l t s  obtained below. For example, we do n o t  
need t o  assume ( a s  w e  do i n  ( g )  above) t h a t  e m i t t e r s  a r e  c e r t a i n  
about t h e i r  c o s t s ;  it i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  assume t h a t  they a r e  l e s s  
unce r t a in  than t h e  p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l  a u t h o r i t y  is .  
Our o b j e c t i v e ,  r e c a l l ,  i s  t o  compare t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  pol icy 
approaches f o r  implementing an environmental q u a l i t y  s tandard.  
Under t h e  f i r s t  approach, which involves t h e  es tabl i shment  of 
emission s tandards  f o r  sources ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  seeks  a set of 
emission s tandards  t h a t  minimizes expected c o s t s  s u b j e c t  t o  
achieving expected ambient concent ra t ions  equal  t o  t h e  ambient 
s tandard.  We may formulate t h i s  problem using +he n o t a t i o n  set 
f o r t h  above as 
Ns Ns 
E { I  C i ( @ i , ~ i ) }  = minimum E {I Ci(e i ,u i )}  
i = l  e i = l  i 
Ns 
s u b j e c t  t o  E {I di (vilei} = s 
i = l  
where N S I i s  t h e  number of e m i t t e r s .  The s o l u t i o n s  Si a r e  t h e  
emission s tandards  t h a t  minimize expected c o s t s  s u b j e c t  t o  the  
environmental q u a l i t y  c o n s t r a i n t ,  and 
is  t h e  expected c o s t  under t h i s  set of r egu la t ions .  
The second pol icy  approach we examine involves t h e  s e t t i n g  
of emission charges s o  a s  t o  minimize expected c o s t  while a t t a i n -  
ing  expected ambient p o l l u t i o n  concent ra t ions  equal  t o  t h e  environ- 
mental q u a l i t y  s tandard.  Let hi(pi ,  u . )  be t h e  funct ion  which re- 
1 
l a t e s  ith e m i t t e r ' s  emissions t o  the  charge l ev ied  on i t s  emissions.  
The random v a r i a b l e  ui is  included reflecting t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y ,  s i n c e  it does no t  know e m i t t e r s '  c o s t  
func t ions ,  cannot be c e r t a i n  about emitters responses t o  any given 
s e t  o f  emiss ion charges .  Then us ing  t h e  n o t a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  
above, t h e  a u t h o r i t y ' s  problem i s  t o  f i n d  t h e  Bi such t h a t  
Ns - Ns 
( 2 )  c i ( h i ( p i , u . )  1 1 = minimum E { I  Ci(hi(pi ,u i )  I ui)  
i = l  Pi i = l  
Ns 
s u b j e c t  t o  E { I  di (v i )h i  (pi  .ui) 1 = S 
i= I.
The t h i r d  p o l i c y  approach we examine r e q u i r e s  e m i t t e r s  t o  b i d  
t o  purchase  pe rmi t s  from t h e  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y .  The 
a u t h o r i t y  is  t o  sel l  no more permi t s  t o  e m i t t e r s  t han  would r e s u l t  
i n  expected ambient p o l l u t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  j u s t  equa l  t o  t h e  en- 
vi ronmental  q u a l i t y  s t anda rd .  W e  w i l l  assume t h a t  each  e m i t t e r  
b i d s  t h e  m a x i m u m  amount it is w i l l i n g  t o  pay f o r  pe rmi t s .  Each 
submits  its b i d s  i n  t h e  form of  a  demand schedule  f o r  pe rmi t s .  
The marginal  c o s t  s av ings  t o ,  s ay ,  Emi t te r  1 from purchase  
of  an  incrementa l  permi t  i s  simply - C l ( e l , u l ) ,  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  
of  i t s  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  emiss ions .  Th i s  then  i s  t h e  
amount t h a t  it would be w i l l i n g  t o  pay f o r  t h e  l a s t  permi t  u n i t  
purchased,  and r e p r e s e n t s  E m i t t e r  1 ' s  demand f u n c t i o n  f o r  permi t s .  
Assuming t h a t  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  does no t  wish t o  
charge a monopo1.y p r i c e  f o r  pe rmi t s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t o  maximize t h e  
n e t  va lue  of ( i . e . ,  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  pay f o r )  pe rmi t s  i s s u e d  sub- 
j e c t  t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  t h e  environmental  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  be 
m e t  on an expec ted  va lue  b a s i s ,  it can be shown t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t y ' s  
problem i s  t o  choose t h e  number of permi t s  t o  i s s u e  t o  each  e m i t t e r ,  
- 
e such t h a t  i 
s u b j e c t  t o  E d i ( v i ) e i l  = s 
which is  p r e c i s e l y  equiva lent  a p a r t  from t h e  cons tant  terms 
Ns Ns 
(4) E{L c ~ ( ; ~ , u ~ ) I  = minimum E { L  c i ( e i I u i ) l  
i = l  e i = l  i 
s u b j e c t  t o  E {I di (vi le i)  = s 
where E { I  c ( ; ~ , u . ) }  r ep resen t s  expected t o t a l  c o s t s  a t  the  optimal 
1 
permit a l l o c a t i o n .  
The most important th ing  t o  note  about equat ion  ( 4 )  is  i t s  
s i m i l a r i t y  tc  equat ion ( 1 ) .  There is,  however, one important d i f -  
ference.  Equation ( 4 )  r ep resen t s  t h e  problem faced by t h e  p o l l u t i o n  
con t ro l  a u t h o r i t y  be fo re  it has received b i d  schedules from emitters. 
I n  f a c t ,  t h e  problem t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  s o l v e  begins a f t e r  it 
has received b i d  schedules .  This means t h a t ,  under our  assumption 
t h a t  emit t -ers  a r e  p e r f e c t l y  c e r t a i n  about t h e i r  c o s t s  and base t h e i r  
b i d s  upon them, t h e  p o l l u t i o n  a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  be p e r f e c t l y  c e r t a i n  
about c o n t r o l  c o s t s  a t  the  time it makes i t s  permit  a l l o c a t i o n .  
Therefore i t  can set an a l l o c a t i o n  t h a t  exac t ly  minimizes c o s t s .  
3 .2  Analysis 
Our a n a l y s i s  compares t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  po l i cy  approaches 
descr ibed above i n  terms of two c r i t e r i a .  The f i r s t  c r i t e r i o n  
i s  t he  expected c o s t  t o  which each approach l eads .  Other th ings  
being equal ,  w e  should p r e f e r  a  po l i cy  approach which l eads  t o  
lower expected c o s t  t o  one which leads  t o  h igher  expected c o s t .  
The second c r i t e r i o n  i s  t h e  var iance of expected ambient p o l l u t i o n  
concent ra t ions .  W e  have cons t ra ined  a l l  p o l i c i e s  t o  r e s u l t  i n  
expected ambient p o l l u t i o n  concent ra t ions  equal  t o  t h e  given en- 
vironmental q u a l i t y  s tandard .  This  being t h e  case ,  o t h e r  th ings  
being equa l ,  we would p r e f e r  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  r e s u l t  i n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  
t i g h t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of ambient p o l l u t i o n  concent ra t ions  around 
t h e  environmental q u a l i t y  s tandard.  
The s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  ou r  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  t h r e e  . p o l i c y  in -  
s t ruments  desc r ibed  above i s  a  q u a d r a t i c  approximation of  e m i t t e r s '  
c o s t  f u n c t i o n s .  This  i s  done because it is  f a r  e a s i e r  t o  work wi th  
q u a d r a t i c  forms than  wi th  many more g e n e r a l  forms, and because i n  
many i n s t a n c e s  q u a d r a t i c  forms provide  q u i t e  good approximat ions .  
W e  w i l l  approximate t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n s  about  t h e  p o i n t  ei by t h e  
f u n c t i o n s  
where the a i (u i )  , and a i ( u . )  a r e  random v a r i a b l e s ,  and where t h e  
I II 1 
Ci and C .  are c o n s t a n t s .  The s i g n  = means "approximately  equa l " .  
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W e  s h a l l  assume t h a t  t h e  a i ( u i )  have been s t a n d a r d i z e d  s o  t h a t  
E {ai  ( u i )  } = 0 f o r  a l l  i. Note a l s o  t h a t  s i n c e  ui and vi a r e  in -  
d e ~ e n d e n t  f o r  a l l  i and j by assumption,  E { a .  (u i )d i  (v i )  1 = E {ai (ui )  } ' 
1 
The b a s i c  approximation given i n  equa t ion  ( 5 )  and assumptions 
about  the random e r r o r s  imply s e v e r a l  o t h e r  approximat ions  t h a t  w i l l  
be u s e f u l  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  w e  s h a l l  develop below. The most impor tan t  
of t h e s e  are t h e  fol lowing:  
( 8 )  E { Ci(ei ,ui)  1 c.. 1 
Note t h a t  equa t ions  ( 7 )  and ( 8 )  p rov ide  us w i t h  an  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of each of t h e  f i x e d  c o e f f i c i e n t s  appear ing i n  equa t ion  ( 5 ) .  
W e  now have a l l  of t h e  b a s i c  i n g r e d i e n t s  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
r equ i r ed  t o  analyze and compare t h e  t h r e e  p o l i c y  approaches de- 
s c r i b e d  i n  Sec t ion  3.1.There is  a f a i r  amount of manipula t ion  
and s u b s t i t u t i o n  involved i n  ou r  a n a l y s i s ,  s o  perheps  it w i l l  be 
useful  t o  o u t l i n e  our a n a l y t i c a l  s t r a t egy .  W e  w i l l  begin by com- 
paring an emission s tandards  pol icy  [as  descr ibed i n  equat ion ( 1 )  
above] t o  an emission charges pol icy  [as  descr ibed i n  equat ion ( 2 )  
above).  Our f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h i s  comparison w i l l  be t o  a e r i v e  an 
e x p l i c i t  approximate expression f o r  t h e  funct ions  h i ( p i , u i ) ,  which 
g ive  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of emissions l e v e l s  ( a s  perceived by t h e  
p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l  ~ . u t h o r i t y ) w h i c h w o u l d  r e s u l t  from any given s e t  
of changes, p i  . The l e v e l s  of emissions t h a t  a c t u a l l y  would a r i s e  
depend, of course,  on the  values taken by t h e  ui, which a r e  known 
under our assumptions only by the  emi t t e r s .  
The second s t e p  of our  a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  t h e  expres- 
s i o n s  we de r ive  f o r  h i (p i fu i )  i n t o  t h e  equat ions r ep resen t ing  t h e  
problem of f ind ing  a  p r i c e  t o  minimize expected c o s t  [equat ion ( 2 )  
above] ,  and t o  f i n d  an expression f o r  t h e  values of t h e  p which if  
we have denoted as  Pi, which so lve  t h i s  problem. 
The t h i r d  s t e p  i s  t o  take  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  expression f o r  sir 
s u b s t i t u t e  it i n  our approximation expression f o r  c o s t s  [ i . e . ,  
equation ( 5 )  above] , and eva lua te  expected c o s t s .  This y i e l d s  
an es t ima te  of expected c o s t s  which we w i l l  compare wi th  a  s i m i l a r  
expression f o r  expected c o s t s  evaluated a t  S i '  This comparison w i l l  
show t h a t  t h e  expected t o t a l  c o s t  of t h e  emissions charge pol icy  
is lower than t h e  expected t o t a l  c o s t  of t h e  emissions s tandard  
pol icy .  
The f i n a l  s t e p  i n  our  comparison of emissions s tandards  and 
emissions charges i s  t o  compare t h e  var iances of t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of ambient a i r  q u a l i t y .  Our a n a l y s i s  w i l l  show t h a t  
t h e  emissions s tandard  pol icy  would r e s u l t  i n  a smal ler  var iance 
i n  ambient concent ra t ions  than would an emission charges po l i cy .  
The s i z e  of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  var iances i s  r e l a t e d  t o  the  same 
f a c t o r s  t h a t  g ive  an emission charges pol icy  an expected c o s t  ad- 
vantage. That i s ,  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  expected c o s t  advantage t h a t  an 
emission charges pol icy  has over  an emission s tandards  po l i cy ,  
t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  d i spe r s ion  of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of ambient p o l l u t i o n  
concent ra t ions  about t h e  environmental q u a l i t y  s tandard  l e v e l .  
Our comparison of a t r a n s f e r a b l e  emissions permit pol icy  t o  
emissions s tandards  and emissions charges fol lows a  s i m i l a r  se- 
quence of s t e p s  t o  t h a t  ou t l ined  above. Our a n a l y s i s  w i l l  show, 
a s  no ted  above,  t h a t  t h e  expec t ed  c o s t  of  a t r a n s f e r a b l e  pe rmi t s  
p o l i c y  is  p r e c i s e l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h a t  of  a n  emi s s ion  cha rges  p o l i c y ,  
and hence $s less t h a n  t h a t  o f  an  emiss ion  s t a n d a r d s  p o l i c y .  W e  
w i l l  a l s o  show t h a t  t h e  d i s p e r s i o n  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  ambient  
p o l l u t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  from a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  emiss ion 
p e r m i t s p o l i c y  i s  t h e  same a s  that  r e s u l t i n g  from an emi s s ion  s t a n -  
d a r d s  p a l i c y a n d  less t h a n  t h a t  r e s u l t i n g  from a n  e m i s s i a n  cha rges  
p o l i c y .  
P roceed ing  acco rd ing  t o  t h e  s t r a t e g y  o u t l i n e d  above,  w e  b e g i n  
by d e r i v i n g  an  approximate  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  h i ( . )  which 
relate  s o u r c e s '  r e s u l t i n g  emi s s ions  l e v e l s  t o  cha rge  l e v e l s .  W e  
know t h a t  f o r  t h e  ith e m i t t e r  t o  minimize c o s t s  when f a c e d  w i t h  an 
emi s s ion  cha rge  pi and s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  ui,  it w i l l  a d j u s t  e m i s -  
s i o n s  t o  t h e  p o i n t  where 
Tha t  i s ,  it w i l l  a d j u s t  emi s s ions  t o  t h e  p o i n t  where i ts  i n c r emen ta l  
c o s t  s a v i n g  from i n c r e a s i n g  emi s s ions  is j u s t  e q u a l  t o  t h e  incremen- 
t a l  charge  l i a b i l i t y  it i n c u r s  by i n c r e a s i n g  emi s s ions .  
S u b s t i t u t i n g  o u r  approximate  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  
t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  ( e q u a t i o n  ( 6 )  ) i n t o  e q u a t i o n  (91 ,  we o b t a i n  
which a f t e r  r ea r rangement  y i e l d s  t h e  fo l l owing  approximate  ex- 
p r e s s i o n  f o r  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  hi ( . )  . 
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These f u n c t i o n s  g i v e  t h e  c o s t  minimizing l e v e l s  o f  emi s s ions  t h a t  
w i l l  be  chosen by e a c h e m i t t e r a t  any charge  l e v e l .  The random 
t e r m  a .  ( u . )  which appea r s  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 0 )  r e f l e c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
1 1  
t h e  agency does n o t  know w i t h  c e r t a i n t y  what l e v e l  o f  emi s s ions  
e a c h e m i t t e r w i l l  p i c k  because  it does  n o t  know each  e m i t t e r ' s  c o s t s  
w i t h  c e r t a i n t y .  
The next  s t e p  i s  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  equa t ion  ( 1 0 )  i n t o  our  
approximate express ion  f o r  c o s t s  (i. e.  equa t ion  ( 5 )  ) , and t o  
e v a l u a t e  approximate expected t o t a l  c o s t s .  When t h i s  i s  done, 
we o b t a i n  
2 
where oi = E { a . ( u . ) a i ( u i ) ?  . 
1 1  
Usinq t h e  approximate exp res s ion  f o r  expected t o t a l  c o s t s  
given i n  equa t ion  ( 1 1 )  above, w e  proceed t o  f i n d  an e x p r e s s i o n  
f o r  the set  of p r i c e s  whichminimizes t h i s  exp res s ion  and a t t a i n s  
expected ambient c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  approximately  equa l  t o  t h e  en- 
vi ronmental  q u a l i t y  s t anda rd .  This  i s  done by minimizing ( 1 1 )  
wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  pi ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  environmental  q u a l i t y  
c o n s t r a i n t .  The f i r s t  o r d e r  necessary  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  a r e  
where ai = E{di(vi) I .  Note t h a t  s i n c e  we r e q u i r e  expec ted  ambient 
p o l l u t i o n c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  under t h e  emiss ions  s t anda rd  p o l i c y  t o  be 
e q u a l  t o  the environmental  q u a l i t y  s t anda rd  l e v e l ,  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  
1 
equa t ion  p re sen ted  i n  (12)  i m p l i e s  t h a t  ei = -Ci. T h i s ,  i n  t u r n ,  
imp l i e s  (by s u b s t i t u t i n g  back i n t o  equa t ion  (10)) t h a t  a t  t h e  opt imal  
emissions charge r a t e s ,  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  emissions r a t e s  per-  
ceived by t h e  agency is 
and t h a t  expected c o s t s  under t h e  emissions I charge po l i cy  a s  given 
by equat ion  ( 1 1 )  evalua ted  a t  pi = - Ci a r e  
3 . 3  Resul t s  
Inspec t ion  of equat ion  ( 1 4 )  r e v e a l s  immediately t h a t  the ex- 
pected c o s t s  of t h e  emission charges  p o l i c y  i s  l e s s  than  t h e  expected 
c o s t  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from t h e  emission s t anda rds  pol icy .  This  can 
be seen by not ing  t h a t  t h e  expected c o s t  o f  t h e  emission charges  
p o l i c y  is  equa l  t o  t h e  expected c o s t  of t h e  emission s tandards  
p o l i c y  l e s s  a term which depends upon t h e  va r i ances  of t h e  i n t e r -  
c e p t s  of t h e  marginal  c o s t  func t ions .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between the  
expected c o s t  of an emiss ions t anda rds  p o l i c y  and t h e  expected c o s t  
of  an e m i s s i o n ~ h a r g e s p o l i c y  i s  
The expected c o s t  advantage of t h e  opt imal  charge po l i cy  comes 
a t  a  p r i c e ,  however. The var iance  of ambient p o l l u t i o n  concen- 
t r a t i o n  under t h e  emission s tandards  p o l i c y  is simply 
\& 
where di is t h e  va r i ance  of d i ( v i ) .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  var iance  of 
ambient p o l l u t i o n  concent ra t ions  under t h e  emission charges po l i cy  
can be shown (by s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e  expres s ion  f o r  t h e  ei contained 
i n  equat ion (13)  i n t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  equa t ion  and eva lua t ing  t h e  
va r i ance  of t h e  r e s u l t i n g  express ion)  t o  be 
This  is c l e a r l y  l a r g e r  than  t h e  var iance  of ambient p o l l u t i o n  con- 
c e n t r a t i o n s  under emission s t anda rds ,  and t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
t h e  two i n c r e a s e s  wi th  inc reas ing  u n c e r t a i n t y  about e m i t t e r s '  c o s t s .  
Our comparison of emission s t anda rds  t o  emission charges 
thus  l eads  us t o  t h e  conclusion t h a t  an emission charges  po l i cy  
l e a d s  t o  lower expected c o s t ,  and less c e r t a i n t y  about r e s u l t i n g  
ambient p o l l u t i o n  concen t ra t ion ,  t han  does, an emission s t anda rds  
po l i cy .  The more unce r t a in  a r e  e m i t t e r s  ' c o s t  func t ions ,  t h e  l a r g e r  
t h e  c o s t  advantage of an emission charges  po l i cy  r e l a t i v e  t o  an 
emission s t anda rds  p o l i c y ,  and t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  environmental  q u a l i t y  
c e r t a i n t y  advantage of an emission s t anda rds  p o l i c y  r e l a t i v e  t o  an 
emission charges  po l i cy .  Any choice  between t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  thus  r e s t s  
upon weighing t h e  b e n e f i t s  of c o s t  sav ings  a g a i n s t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  of 
g r e a t e r  c e r t a i n t y  concerning environmental  q a a l i t y .  This  t rade-off  
a n a l y s i s  would have t o  be made i n  o r d e r  t o  dec ide  which of  t h e  two 
policies--emission.  s t anda rds  o r  emission charges--is  b e t t e r .  
I t  i s  a r e l a t i v e l y  simple ma t t e r  t o  extend t h e  a n a l y s i s  pre- 
sen ted  above t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  t h e  expected c o s t  and va r i ance  of 
ambient p o l l u t i o n  concen t ra t ions  which would r e s u l t  from a t r a n s f e r -  
a b l e  emission;permits  p o l i c y .  Under t h i s  type  of po l i cy ,  given our  
assumptions t h a t  e m i t t e r s  always know e x a c t l y  t h e i r  c o s t  func t ions  
and r evea l  them i n  b idding  f o r  permi ts ,  t h e  agency a l l o c a t e s  an 
- 
amount of permi ts  t o  each emi t te r ,  ei, such t h a t *  
* 
Equation (18)  follows d i r e c t l y  from t h e  f i r s t  o rde r  necessary 
cond i t ions  f o r  t h e  problem s t a t e d  i n  equat ion  ( 4 )  above. 
S e t t i n g  o u r  approximate  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  i n c r e m e n t a l  c o s t s  i n  equa- 
t i o n  ( 6 )  above e q u a l  t o  t h e  r i g h t - h a n d  side o f  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 8 )  above 
- 
and s o l v i n g  f o r  e w e  o b t a i n  i ' 
Note t h e  s t r i k i n g  s i m i l a r i t y  between e q u a t i o n s  (19)  and ( 1 0 ) .  In-  
deed ,  t h e y  are p r e c i s e l y  t h e  same e q u a t i o n ,  and a f u l l  a n a l y s i s  o f  
e q u a t i o n s  (18)  and ( 1 9 )  p a r a l l e l i n g  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  e q u a t i o n  (12)  
above l e a d s  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  -- e x  a n t e ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  a l l o c a t i o n  
- 
ei o f  p e r m i t s  under  t h e  o p t i m a l  m a r k e t a b l e  p e r m i t  sys tem i s  
I f  f o l l o w s  immedia te ly ,  by s u b s t i t u t i o n  back i n t o  e q u a t i o n  ( 5 )  and 
t a k i n g  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r a b l e  e m i s s i o r p e r n i t s  p o l i c y  
e n j o y s  t h e  same e x ~ e c t e d  c o s t  advan tage  t h a t  is  en joyed  by t h e  e m i s -  
s i o n  c h a r g e s  p o l i c y .  That  is ,  e x p e c t e d  c o s t  under  t r a n s f e r a b l e  
p e r m i t s i s  less t h a n  e x p e c t e d  c o s t  under  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d s  by t h e  
amount g i v e n  i n  e q u a t i o n  (15)  above. 
I n  computing t h e  v a r i a n c e  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  ambient  p o l l u -  
t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  from a t r a n s f e r a b l e  e m i s s i o n  p e r m i t  
p o l i c y  w e  proceed  a s  w e  d i d  above f o r  t h e  e m i s s i o n s  c h a r g e  p o l i c y ,  
w i t h  one v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  e x c e p t i o n .  Under t h e  t r a n s f e r a b l e  p e r m i t  
p o l i c y ,  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  l e a r n s  t h e  a .  (u.) from 
1 1  
emitters t h r o u g h  t h e  b i d s  s u b m i t t e d  p r i o r  t o  making i t s  d e c i s i 0 . n ~ .  
The a i ( u i )  a r e  t h u s  n o t  random v a r i a b l e s  a t  t h e  t i m e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
i s  made, and t h e  v a r i a n c e  o f  ambient  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  i s  g i v e n  ap- 
p r o x i m a t e l y  by  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 6 ) - - t h e  e q u a t i o n  which g i v e s  t h e  v a r i -  
ance  o f  ambient  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  under t h e  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d s  p o l i c y .  
Th i s  i s  a  most i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t .  I f  w e  a c c e p t  t h e  assumpt ions  
upon which it rests, w e  conc lude  t h a t  b o t h  a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  e m i s s i o n  
p e r m i t s  and a n  e m i s s i o n  c h a r g e s  p o l i c y  have c o s t  advan tages  o v e r  an 
emission s t anda rds  pol icy .  W e  a l s o  conclude t h a t  t h e  va r i ance  of 
ambient p o l l u t i o n  concen t ra t ions  under a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  permits  
po l i cy  i s  equal t o  t h a t  under an  emission s t anda rds  po l i cy .  Based 
on our  two c r i t e r i a ,  expected c o s t  and t h e  p r e c i s i o n  wi th  which 
a  po l i cy  meets environmental q u a l i t y  s tandard  l e v e l s ,  ou r  analy- 
s is  l e a d s  t o  t h e  conclus ion  t h a t  a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  permi ts  po l i cy  
i s  t h e  b e s t  po l i cy  inst rument  t o  use i n  o rde r  t o  implement an 
environmental q u a l i t y  s tandard .  
4.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The conclusions reached above admit tedly depend upon the as- 
sumption t h a t  c o n t r o l  c o s t  func t ions  may be approximated s a t i s -  
f a c t o r i l y  by a  q u a d r a t i c  of t h e  form of equat ion  ( 5 ) .  Malcomson 
(1978)  has poin ted  o u t  t h a t  t h i s  approximation is  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
v a l i d ,  and t h a t  when it i s  n o t ,  conclusions concerning t h e  r e l a t i v e  
magnitudes of expected c o s t s  under d i f f e r e n t  a l l o c a t i o n s  p o l i c i e s  
may be a f f e c t e d .  
This  c r i t i c i s m ,  whi le  i t s  importance i s  n o t  t o  be minimized, 
i s  perhaps less s e r i o u s  i n  t h e  con tex t  w e  a r e  cons ide r ing  here .  
Under t h e  assumption t h a t  emitters know and r e v e a l  t h e i r  a c t u a l  
c o s t s  i n  t h e  process  of o f f e r i n g  t o  buy and s e l l  emissions per- 
m i t s ,  we may be assured  t h a t  whatever t h e  n a t u r e  of  randomness 
i n  e m i t t e r s '  c o s t  func t ions ,  c o s t s  of meeting ( i n  expec ta t ion )  
an environmental q u a l i t y  s tandard  w i l l  be minimized. The conclusion 
t h a t  a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  emission permits  po l i cy  would l e a d  t o  t h e  
lowest  expected c o s t  of t h e  p o l i c i e s  considered t h u s  appears  t o  
hold,  Malcomson's c a u t i o n s  notwithstanding.  
Our r e s u l t s  concerning t h e  r e l a t i v e  expected a o s t s o f  an emis- 
s i o n  s tandards  p o l i c y  and an emission charges  po l i cy  a r e  n o t  robus t  
wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  of t h e  way i n  which ran- 
dom e r r o r s  e n t e r  c o s t  f u n c t i o n s .  Examples can be cons t ruc ted  i n  
which an emission s t anda rds  po l i cy  would r e s u l t  i n  a  lower expected 
c o s t  than would an emission charges po l i cy .  While one may quibble  
about t h e  reasonableness  of formulat ions  t h a t  l e a d  t o  t h e  conclu- 
s i o n  t h a t  an emission s t anda rds  p o l i c y  would r e s u l t  i n  lower ex- 
pec ted  c o n t r o l  c o s t s ,  t h e  l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  of such a r e s u l t  
cannot  (and should no t  g iven p r e s e n t  u n c e r t a i n t y  about  p o l l u t i o n  
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c o n t r o l  c o s t s )  be denied.  
Somewhat l e s s  technical- -and more t e l l i n g  i n  t h e  a rena  o f  
p u b l i c  debate--arguments have been advanced a g a i n s t  t h e  use  o f  
emiss ion charges  o r  t r a n s f e r a b l e  emission permi t s .  Most have con- 
cerned p r a c t i c a l  " d i f f i c u l t i e s "  wi th  t h e  d e s i g n  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
of  a  workable t r a n s f e r a b l e  permi t s  system. T ie t enbe rg  (1979) has 
reviewed and analyzed t h e s e  arguments and found them t o  be ,  f o r  
t h e  most p a r t ,  w i thou t  m e r i t .  
To be s u r e ,  t h e r e  a r e  a number of  p r a c t i c a l  i s s u e s  concerning 
t h e  choice  of op t imal  p o l i c y  in s t rumen t s  f o r  meeting an environmen- 
t a l  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  that  a r e  n o t  addressed by ou r  formal  a n a l y s i s  
i n  S e c t i o n s  2 and 3 and t h a t  a l s o  w e r e  n o t  a t  i s s u e  i n  T i e t e n b e r g ' s  
a n a l y s i s .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  t h e s e  i s s u e s  t ends  t o  
r e i n f o r c e  t h e c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  a system of  t r a n s f e r a b l e  pe rmi t s  is 
t h e  b e s t  p o l i c y  in s t rumen t  f o r  meeting an environmental  q u a l i t y  
s t anda rd .  
For example, a p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  problem that  cannot  be 
avoided i s  t h e  accommodation o f  p o l i c y  t o  changing c i rcumstances .  
Over t i m e  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  changes ( i .e .  i n f l a t i o n ) ,  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  
change,  emitters expand and c o n t r a c t  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s ,  new emitters 
seek t o  e n t e r  t h e  a r e a ,  and technology changes,  And, w i th  t h e  
passage of  t i m e ,  u n c e r t a i n t y  becomes pe rvas ive  and p o t e n t i a l l y  
d i s r u p t i v e .  A t r a n s f e r a b l e  emiss ion permi t s  p o l i c y  d e a l s  w i t h  t h i s  
t y p e  o f  problem i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e f f e c t i v e  and n a t u r a l  way. Simply 
pu t ,  changed c i rcumstances  are accommodated by changes i n  t h e  p r i c e s  
a t  which permi t s  a r e  t r a n s f e r r e d .  I f ,  f o r  example, t h e r e  i s  marked 
economic growth i n  an a r e a ,  t h i s  w i l l  be r e f l e c t e d  i n  i n c r e a s e d  
demands f o r  emiss ion pe rmi t s  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  and o t h e r  t h i n g s  being 
equa l ,  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  their p r i c e .  A t r a n s f e r a b l e  pe rmi t s  p o l i c y  
t h u s  a d j u s t s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  t o  changing c i rcumstances .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  
an  emiss ion s t a n d a r d s  p o l i c y  o r  an emiss ion changes p o l i c y  r e q u i r e  
t h a t  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  a u t h o r i t y  a c t  t o  a d j u s t  t h e  p o l i c y  i n  
t h e  f a c e  of  changed c o n d i t i o n s ,  
I t  i s  a l s o  r e l a t i v e l y  easy  t o  d e a l  wi th  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  uncer- 
t a i n t y  t h a t  t h e  t ime dimension in t roduces .  The e a s i e s t  way t o  
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Weitzman (1978) makes t h e  c a s e  f o r  qu ibb l ing .  
do t h i s  i s  t o  allow forward t r a n s a c t i o n s  i n  permits .  I n  
t h i s  way, emitters can s h i e l d  themselves from unce r t a in ty  i n  much 
t h e  same fash ion  t h a t  companies engaging i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  
s h i e l d  themselves from unce r t a in ty  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  exchange r a t e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  by buying and s e l l i n g  cu r renc ies  i n  forward markets. 
This provides  an automatic way f o r  emitters t o  cope wi th  unce r t a in ty .  
I n  sum, the transferable emissions permit  po l i cy  has many de- 
s i r a b l e  f e a t u r e s  t o  recommend it. I t  promises both e f f i c i e n c y  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  I t  accommodates change and unce r t a in ty .  The prac- 
t i c a l  arguments t h a t  have been advanced a g a i n s t  t h i s  po l i cy  f o r  
t h e  most p a r t  a r e  groundless .  
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